Giorgio Chiovelli
Giorgio Chiovelli is an Associate Professor of Economics at Universidad de Montevideo. Giorgio was born in Spoleto, Italy, and he holds a B.A. in International Relations from Bologna University, an MSc in Economics from the Barcelona School of Economics, and a Ph.D. in Economics from Bologna University. After completing his doctorate in 2015, he joined the Department of Economics at the London Business School as a Research Fellow. His work has been funded by the IGC, SSHRC, and The Pearson Institute. Giorgio’s primary research interests focus on political economy, development, and economic history. His research has appeared in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, the Journal of the European Economic Association, and the Journal of Politics, among others.
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Giorgio Chiovelli is an Associate Professor of Economics at Universidad de Montevideo. Giorgio was born in Spoleto, Italy, and he holds a B.A. in International Relations from Bologna University, an MSc in Economics from the Barcelona School of Economics, and a Ph.D. in Economics from Bologna University. After completing his doctorate in 2015, he joined the Department of Economics at the London Business School as a Research Fellow. His work has been funded by the IGC, SSHRC, and The Pearson Institute. Giorgio’s primary research interests focus on political economy, development, and economic history. His research has appeared in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, the Journal of the European Economic Association, and the Journal of Politics, among others.
In their own words…
IEA: Can you tell us a little bit about your life story, what got you interested in economics, and how you decided to pursue an academic career?
Giorgio: I am from Italy but live in Uruguay, where I am an Associate Professor in the Economics Department at Universidad de Montevideo. Before moving to Uruguay, I had the chance to live in a few exciting places in Europe: I hold a Master’s degree from the Barcelona School of Economics and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bologna for my Ph.D. Additionally, I held a Research Fellow position at the London Business School.
Becoming an academic economist was not in my plans after high school. When I started my bachelor’s in political science at the University of Bologna, my primary ambition was to become a diplomat. I was deeply fascinated by international relations, history, and politics. My perspective began to shift during a macroeconomics course taught by Matteo Cervellati. This course was very interesting; it unveiled the potential of economics as a field that could address my interests in politics and global affairs. His lessons delved into democratization, conflict, and demographic transition, illustrating how economic theories and models could be applied to understand and analyze political phenomena. Moving to Barcelona for my master’s in economics at BSE was another pivotal moment in my academic journey. While catching up on micro theory and metrics, I also explored political economy, economic history, and applied econometrics. I attended several seminars on long-term development and growth at BSE that exposed me to cutting-edge research ideas. In particular, I remember a talk by Stelios Michalopoulos. In his work with Elias Papaioannou, he explored the historical implications of the Congress of Berlin and its role in shaping contemporary conflict patterns in sub-Saharan Africa. This blend of history and econometrics was the research I aspired to pursue.
My research agenda continues to explore the intersections among political economy, growth, and economic history. I have worked and continue to work in areas such as the political economy of consolidating democracies; post-conflict management studying, for example, the aggregate economic effect of landmine clearance or the impact of forced displacement on human capital; the political economy of trade agreements; and historical comparative development in Africa and Latin America.
IEA: In your recent work, you study the impact of agricultural trade liberalization on economic activity and political violence in emerging countries. Can you briefly summarize your findings? What made you interested in this topic?
Giorgio: Trade liberalization is often promoted as a pathway to economic prosperity but also creates winners and losers. This has led to increased political polarization in high-income countries, but what happens in low- and middle-income countries is less understood. Contrary to what standard trade models predict, globalization has not reduced inequality in these emerging economies. Instead, we found that it triggers distributional conflict and increases political violence, particularly in fragile states. To explore this, my colleagues Francesco Amodio, Leonardo Baccini, Michele di Maio, and I examined all preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed between 25 low- and middle-income countries and their high-income trade partners from 1995 to 2013. Focusing on the agricultural sector, we combined data on tariff cuts by crop with highly detailed information on the suitability of different regions to produce those crops provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization. This allowed us to compare areas within countries that are more or less suited to agriculture before and after implementing each PTA. We used nighttime luminosity to measure economic activity and geo-referenced information from a media-based database to track political violence. Our findings indicate that if these countries had not entered into any Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), economic activity would have been 2% lower. However, political violence would have been 7% lower. Interestingly, the surge in political violence was not uniform; it was more pronounced in urban areas where agricultural production is less labor-intensive, and the crops affected by trade liberalization are also consumed locally. These results suggest that agricultural trade liberalization can exacerbate distributional conflicts when workers and consumers don’t share the gains from trade, with urban areas being particularly vulnerable.
Our study underscores a critical point for policymakers: while trade liberalization can spur economic growth, it can also lead to political instability if the benefits are unevenly distributed. Hence, it is crucial to complement trade policies with measures that address these imbalances to prevent potential violence and instability. The intersection of economic policy and its real-world impacts on societies stimulated my interest in this topic, especially in regions where the political fabric is delicate. Understanding these dynamics is key to crafting policies that promote sustainable and inclusive growth.
IEA: Another paper you worked on was the fiscal and political consequences of state modernization in the Spanish colonial empire in Latin America. Can you briefly summarize your findings?
Giorgio: In my research with Leopoldo Fergusson, Luis Martinez, Juan David Torres, and Felipe Valencia, we explore the fiscal and political consequences of state modernization within the Spanish colonial empire in Latin America, particularly focusing on the transformative reforms of the late 18th century under the Bourbon Dynasty. State formation in developing countries is crucial for economic growth and development, with bureaucratic institutions playing a significant role in raising revenue, enforcing laws, and regulating economic activities. While previous works have extensively studied state-building in Western Europe, there is a notable gap in understanding these processes in other regions, especially those under colonial rule. Our work aims to bridge this gap by examining one of the most ambitious administrative reforms of the era: the introduction of the intendancy system in Spain’s American colonies. The Spanish Crown’s reforms sought to overhaul the colonial administration by replacing the corrupt and exploitative corregidores with a new corps of provincial governors called intendants. These intendants were carefully selected, well-paid, and appointed indefinitely, which reduced incentives for corruption and exploitation of indigenous communities. This shift from a centralized system with a few powerful viceroys to a more dispersed governance model has been described as a “bureaucratic conquest” of America.
Our findings show that the intendancy system sizably increased Crown revenue by strengthening state presence in the periphery and disrupting local elite capture. First, the intendancy system significantly reduced the distance between administrative centers and the local population. This proximity led to more effective tax collection and increased Crown revenue, particularly near the new intendancy capitals. Second, intendants, often selected from Spain, were less susceptible to local corruption. Their longer tenure further enhanced their effectiveness, disrupting the economic privileges of the Creole elites and reducing corruption. Politically, the reform had a dual effect. First, it decreased indigenous rebellions by improving law and order. Second, it increased Creole animosity towards the Crown due to the curtailment of their privileges. This growing discontent among Creoles was evidenced by a decline in naming male newborns after colonial figures, indicating a shift in loyalty. The increased revenue under the intendants correlated with heightened revolutionary activity during the early independence period (1807-1811), suggesting that the Crown’s modernization efforts inadvertently fueled the independence movements that led to the collapse of Spanish colonial rule. Thus, while the intendancy system strengthened fiscal control, it also set the stage for the empire’s eventual demise.
IEA: Why is this research relevant today?
Giorgio: Our research underscores the critical importance of effective governance and bureaucratic reforms in promoting both economic development and political stability. It emphasizes that simply expanding the state’s presence is insufficient; the competence and integrity of government officials are crucial factors. These findings resonate with contemporary challenges in numerous developing nations, where corruption and inefficient governance hinder progress. Moreover, our examination of a colonial setting with no inclusive political institutions demonstrates that modernizing the state may fail to foster common interests and can even provoke political opposition. This highlights the significance of consensus and reciprocity—or their absence—in the process of effective state-building and enhancing fiscal capacity. These issues are particularly pressing for many developing countries globally.
IEA: Why is it important for economic research to be diverse and inclusive?
Giorgio: Economic research must be diverse and inclusive because different perspectives bring about more comprehensive and accurate analyses of the issues we want to solve as economists. A diverse group of economists from various backgrounds and cultures broadens the scope of our research questions and, consequently, the solutions we propose. At the same time, diversity encourages innovation and creativity in research methodologies and approaches, leading to more robust and relevant findings. It is not “just” about representation. Achieving a more diverse academic community has to do with unleashing the full potential of talent and perspectives to make meaningful contributions to improving people’s lives through better and newer economic research.